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INTRODUCTION
When a dispute arises and the parties are from different states or
more than one law within a single jurisdiction applies to the dispute,
which law should govern? Choice-of-law rules answer that question.
In the early years following the founding of the United States, state
law was fairly uniform, so it usually did not matter which state’s law
was applied. 1 However, in subsequent years, states enacted statutes
that conflicted with those of their sister states. 2
Choice-of-law “is a device for choosing among states’ substantive
laws.” 3 Writing in 1927, Justice Benjamin Cardozo called conflict of

∗ J.D. candidate, May 2010, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of
Technology; B.A., International Studies, 1997, Rhodes College.
1
Robert H. Jackson, Full Faith and Credit—The Lawyer’s Clause of the
Constitution, 45 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 11 (1945). Justice Jackson’s article, which was
given as the fourth annual Benjamin N. Cardozo Lecture on December 7, 1944,
provides excellent insight into the origins of the Full Faith and Credit Clause and the
Supreme Court’s full faith and credit jurisprudence through the early 1940s.
2
Id.
3
Scott Fruehwald, Choice of Law in Federal Courts: A Reevaluation, 37
BRANDEIS L.J. 21, 40 (1998).
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laws “one of the most baffling subjects of legal science.” 4 At that
time, American conflict of laws jurisprudence was in its infancy, and
U.S. courts were following a single choice-of-law methodology. 5 Over
twenty-five years later, Dean William Prosser wrote, “[t]he realm of
the conflict of laws is a dismal swamp, filled with quaking quagmires,
and inhabited by learned but eccentric professors who theorize about
mysterious matters in a strange and incomprehensible jargon. The
ordinary court, or lawyer, is quite lost when engulfed and entangled in
it.” 6 Today, resolving conflicts between competing state laws is a
complex endeavor because states have adopted a variety of choice-oflaw approaches.
Conflicts in bankruptcy cases usually occur when the debtor and
creditors are from more than one state, but they can also involve a
conflict between U.S. bankruptcy law and a foreign nation’s
bankruptcy law. 7 In determining the parties’ rights in a bankruptcy
proceeding, the bankruptcy court must first determine whether state or
federal law governs the parties’ rights. 8 If state law governs a right,
then the court must determine which state’s law applies. 9 For example,
a court will look to state law to determine whether a contract, on
which a creditor’s claim is based, is valid. 10 If the contract was made
4

BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE PARADOXES OF LEGAL SCIENCE 67 (Columbia
Univ. Press 1945) (1928).
5
The terms approaches and methodologies are all used in describing various
choice-of-law schemes. Generally, the choice-of-law approaches or methodologies
provide the broad choice-of-law standards, which include specific choice-of-law
rules for various areas of law.
6
William L. Prosser, Interstate Publication, 51 MICH. L. REV. 959, 971 (1953).
7
Patrick J. Borchers, Choice of Law Relative to Security Interests and Other
Liens in International Bankruptcies, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 165, 171 (1998).
8
John T. Cross, State Choice of Law Rules in Bankruptcy, 42 OKLA. L. REV.
531, 533 (1989).
9
Id.
10
“Claim” is defined as a:
(A) right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to
judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured,
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between parties from different states and the contract would be valid
under the law of one state but not the other, a choice-of-law issue can
arise.
With the exception of the choice-of-law rule provided in 11
U.S.C. § 522(b)(3)(A) for determining which state’s exemptions a
debtor may claim to exempt property from the bankruptcy estate, 11
federal bankruptcy law does not provide choice-of-law rules for
bankruptcy cases or guidance on how state law conflicts should be

unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or
unsecured; or
(B) right to an equitable remedy for breach of performance if
such breach gives rise to a right to payment, whether or not such
right to an equitable remedy is reduced to judgment, fixed,
contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, secured, or
unsecured.
11 U.S.C. § 101(5) (2006).
11
An individual debtor may exempt property under the:
State or local law that is applicable on the date of the filing of
the petition at the place in which the debtor’s domicile has been
located for the 730 days immediately preceding the date of the
filing of the petition or if the debtor’s domicile has not been
located at a single State for such 730-day period, the place in
which the debtor’s domicile was located for 180 days immediately
preceding the 730-day period or for a longer portion of such 180day period than in any other place.
11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(3)(A). Congress amended the provision in 2005 to prevent forum
shopping by debtors who move from one state to another prior to filing bankruptcy
to take advantage of a more generous state exemption statute. In re Jevine, 387 B.R.
301, 303 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2008). Both the Eighth and Ninth Circuit Courts of
Appeals have stated that 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(3), formerly 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(2), is a
federal choice-of-law provision that does not incorporate the state choice-of-law
rules. See In re Drenttel, 403 F.3d 611, 613–14 (8th Cir. 2005); In re Arrol, 170 F.3d
934, 936 (9th Cir. 1999) (“This is a federal choice of law in which the choice has
been made. That choice is the applicable state exemption law, and in this case the
exemption is California’s statutory homestead exemption. Whatever California’s
conflicts of law jurisprudence may be is simply irrelevant.”).
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resolved. 12 The U.S. Supreme Court has never directly addressed
whether federal courts should apply state choice-of-law rules in
bankruptcy cases or other federal question jurisdiction cases. 13 Klaxon
Co. v. Stentor Electric Manufacturing Co. requires federal courts
exercising diversity jurisdiction to apply the choice-of-law rules of the
state in which the court is sitting.14 However, Klaxon has never been
extended to federal question cases. 15 Thus, it remains an open question
whether federal courts should apply state or federal choice-of-law
rules in bankruptcy cases.
Left to grapple with the choice-of-law issue on their own without
any clear direction from the Bankruptcy Code 16 or the Supreme Court,
the federal courts have been divided over the correct approach in
bankruptcy and other federal question cases. Some courts apply the
choice-of-law rules of the forum state and cite Klaxon as authority,
while other courts reject application of Klaxon and apply a federal
common law choice-of-law rule. 17 A third group tempers its approach
by considering whether there is a compelling federal interest before
applying the forum state’s choice-of-law rules. 18
The Seventh Circuit recently had an opportunity to take a position
on whether state choice-of-law rules or a federal choice-of-law
approach should be applied in bankruptcy cases, but it declined to do
12

See Jackie Gardina, The Perfect Storm: Bankruptcy, Choice of Law, and
Same-Sex Marriage, 86 B.U. L. REV. 881, 883 (2006); Cross, supra note 8, at 534;
In re SMEC, Inc., 160 B.R. 86, 89 (M.D. Tenn. 1993).
13
See Vanston Bondholders Protective Comm. v. Green, 329 U.S. 156 (1946),
reh’g denied, 329 U.S. 833 (1947); D’Oench, Duhme & Co. v. Fed. Deposit Ins.
Corp., 315 U.S. 447 (1942), reh’g denied, 315 U.S. 830 (1942). The Supreme Court
had an opportunity to determine whether federal courts should apply federal or state
choice-of-law rules when exercising federal question jurisdiction in both cases but
resolved the cases on other grounds. Vanston, 329 U.S. at 161–67; D’Oench, 315
U.S. at 455–56.
14
313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941).
15
Gardina, supra note 12, at 907–09.
16
11 U.S.C. §§ 101–1527 (2006).
17
Gardina, supra note 12, at 909–10.
18
Id. at 910.
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so. 19 While the outcome of In re Jafari would not have been altered by
the application of federal choice-of-law rules, the court failed to
elevate discussion of the issue. If the Seventh Circuit had applied the
federal common law choice-of-law approach used by the First and
Ninth Circuits in bankruptcy and other federal question cases,20 the
enlarged circuit split might have garnered the interest of Congress or
the Supreme Court in resolving the issue. 21
The traditional and modern choice-of-law approaches are flawed,
and legal scholars have advocated the creation of a new set of choiceof-law rules. 22 Application of state choice-of-law rules in bankruptcy
cases results in inconsistent outcomes, which is at odds with the
uniform nature of the federal bankruptcy system. The forum state’s
choice-of-law rules can result in the selection of substantive law of a
state that has little or no relationship to the dispute between the
parties. 23 In addition, the variety of choice-of-law rules, and therefore
the options available for debtors or creditors seeking favorable state
law, encourages forum shopping. 24 Furthermore, litigation of choiceof-law issues depletes the bankruptcy estate’s assets. Thus, all

19

In re Jafari, 569 F.3d 644, 649 (7th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S.Ct. 1077

(2010).
20

In re Vortex Fishing Sys., 277 F.3d 1057 (9th Cir. 2002) (bankruptcy case);
Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs v. Springfield Terminal Ry. Co., 210 F.3d 18 (1st Cir.
2000) (Railway Labor Act); In re Lindsay, 59 F.3d 942 (9th Cir. 1995) (bankruptcy
case); Chuidian v. Philippine Nat’l Bank, 976 F.2d 561 (9th Cir. 1992) (Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act); Edelman v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 861 F.2d 1291 (1st
Cir. 1988) (Edge Act).
21
See discussion of the circuit split infra Part II.B.
22
SYMEON C. SYMEONIDES, THE AMERICAN CHOICE-OF-LAW REVOLUTION:
PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE ¶ 370. (2006) [hereinafter SYMEONIDES, THE
AMERICAN CHOICE-OF-LAW REVOLUTION]; Friedrich K. Juenger, A Third Conflicts
Restatement?, 75 IND. L.J 403, 415–16 (2000).
23
See infra Part III.A.1.
24
See infra Part III.A.2. An involuntary bankruptcy case may be filed by
creditors to force a debtor into Chapter 7 or Chapter 11 bankruptcy pursuant to the
requirements found in 11 U.S.C. § 303 of the Bankruptcy Code; thus, creditors also
have the ability to forum shop.
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creditors vying for a share of the assets are impacted by a choice-oflaw dispute.
Given the Supreme Court’s reluctance to address the issue and the
limits that the Court has imposed for creation of federal common
law, 25 Congress should enact choice-of-law rules for bankruptcy
proceedings, which it has the power to do under the Bankruptcy
Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause, or alternatively, under
the Full Faith and Credit Clause. 26 As the Supreme Court has stated,
“‘[w]hether latent federal power should be exercised to displace state
law is primarily a decision for Congress,’ not the federal courts.”27
This Note explores the current choice-of-law methodologies used by
the courts and the impact of choice-of-law rules in the bankruptcy
context, and argues that Congress should enact federal choice-of-law
rules for bankruptcy cases.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Bankruptcy Law Generally
Bankruptcy law brings order to the financial chaos caused when a
debtor becomes insolvent. While bankruptcy law has multiple goals,
its primary purposes are to provide the debtor with a fresh start 28 and

25

Atherton v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 519 U.S. 213, 218 (1997) (quoting
O’Melveny & Myers v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 512 U.S. 79, 87 (1994) (“The
[Supreme] Court has said that ‘cases in which judicial creation of a special federal
rule would be justified . . . are . . . ‘few and restricted.’”)
26
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18; U.S. CONST.
art. IV, § 1.
27
Atherton, 519 U.S. at 218 (quoting Wallis v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., 384
U.S. 63, 68 (1966)).
28
See Marrama v. Citizens Bank of Mass., 549 U.S. 365, 367 (2007) (“The
principal purpose of the Bankruptcy Code is to grant a ‘fresh start’ to the ‘honest but
unfortunate debtor.’”) (quoting Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 286–87 (1991);
Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934) (providing a fresh start “gives to
the honest but unfortunate debtor who surrenders for distribution the property which
he owns at the time of bankruptcy, a new opportunity in life and a clear field for
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to ensure equitable distribution of the bankruptcy estate. 29 Congress is
authorized to enact bankruptcy laws pursuant to Article I, Section 8,
Clause 4 of the U.S. Constitution, which provides that Congress has
the power “[t]o establish . . . uniform Laws on the subject of
Bankruptcies throughout the United States.” 30 Most states had
insolvency or bankruptcy laws in place before the Constitution was
enacted; 31 however, the Founders were aware of the difficulties that
courts would encounter in bankruptcy cases where the parties were
from different states. In The Federalist No. 42, James Madison
explained the need for providing Congress with the power to establish
federal bankruptcy law:
The power of establishing uniform laws of bankruptcy
is so intimately connected with the regulation of
commerce, and will prevent so many frauds where the
parties or their property may lie or be removed into
different States, that the expediency of it seems not
likely to be drawn into question. 32
The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 33 (the Bankruptcy Code), as
amended by the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer

future effort, unhampered by the pressure and discouragement of preexisting debt”)
(emphasis in original).
29
See Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323, 328–329 (1966) (“[A] chief purpose of
the bankruptcy laws is ‘to secure a prompt and effectual administration and
settlement of the estate of all bankrupts within a limited period[.]”) (quoting Ex parte
Christy, 44 U.S. 292, 312 (1845); Kothe v. R.C. Taylor Trust, 280 U.S. 224, 227
(1930) (“The broad purpose of the Bankruptcy Act is to bring about an equitable
distribution of the bankrupt’s estate among creditors holding just demands based
upon adequate consideration.”).
30
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
31
COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 20.01[1] (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer
eds., 16th ed. 2009).
32
THE FEDERALIST NO. 42, at 277–78 (James Madison) (The Modern Library
ed., n.d.).
33
Pub. L. No. 96-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978).
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Protection Act of 2005 34 (BAPCPA), is the current bankruptcy law.
Although the Bankruptcy Code is federal law, 35 it prioritizes,
enforces, and either affirms or denies a number of rights,
responsibilities, and remedies created by state law and sometimes by
nonbankruptcy federal law. 36 For example, because “[p]roperty
interests are created and defined by state law,” state law must be used
to resolve questions involving property rights in the bankruptcy
estate’s assets “[u]nless some federal interest requires a different
result.” 37
For an individual debtor, bankruptcy provides a fresh start by
allowing the discharge of debts under Chapter 7 or by allowing the
debtor to come up with a Chapter 13 plan to restructure and pay off his
or her debts and discharge certain debts after successfully completing
his or her plan. 38 Businesses, with a few exceptions, can also either
liquidate under Chapter 7 39 or take advantage of the reorganization
provisions under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code to restructure
their secured and unsecured debts, as well as their equity interests. 40
Creditors benefit under the bankruptcy process because it ensures an
equitable distribution of the debtor’s assets among creditors of the
same class. 41
34

Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (2005) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 11 U.S.C.).
35
11 U.S.C. §§ 101–1527 (2006).
36
Cross, supra note 8, at 535; Gardina, supra note 12, at 887–88.
37
Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 55 (1979).
38
See Marrama v. Citizens Bank of Mass., 549 U.S. 365, 367 (2007); COLLIER
ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 31, ¶ 1.01[1].
39
11 U.S.C. § 109 (2006).
40
COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 31, ¶ 1.01[1].
41
For example, the bankruptcy trustee has the power under 11 U.S.C. § 547
and 11 U.S.C. § 550 to avoid and recover for the bankruptcy estate a prebankruptcy
transfer of the debtor’s property to pay or secure the obligations of a creditor. By
recovering the “preference,” no creditor is preferred to the detriment of another
creditor. In enacting this provision, Congress stated that “‘[t]he operation of the
preference section to deter ‘the race of diligence’ of creditors to dismember the
debtor before bankruptcy furthers the second goal of the preference section—that of
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District courts exercise original jurisdiction over bankruptcy cases
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1334. 42 District courts are permitted under 28
U.S.C. § 157(a) to refer their jurisdiction over bankruptcy cases to
bankruptcy courts, which were created as units of the district courts by
28 U.S.C. § 151. 43 All judicial districts have entered orders referring
all bankruptcy matters to the bankruptcy courts. 44 Under the criteria
provided in 28 U.S.C. § 158, appeals from bankruptcy court orders,
final judgments, and decrees can be heard by the district courts, the
bankruptcy appellate panel (if one has been established by the circuit’s
judicial council), or directly to the federal courts of appeals (if
statutory criteria are met). 45 The federal courts exercise federal
question jurisdiction in bankruptcy cases. 46
B. The Development of Choice-of-Law in the U.S.
When a legal dispute between two or more parties occurs and
significant aspects of a case are related to more than one jurisdiction,
there must be a set of rules to determine which jurisdiction’s
substantive laws apply. 47 The body of law that generally tries to create
solutions to these conflicts is called “conflict of laws,” and courts
determine which state’s law to apply in a case using “choice-of-law”
rules. 48 Conflicts between laws most often arise vertically (between

equality of distribution.’” Union Bank v. Wolas, 502 U.S. 151, 161 (1991) (quoting
H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, at 178 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6137).
42
COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 31, at ¶ 3.01[1].
43
Id.
44
Id.
45
Id. at ¶ 5.02[1]–[2].
46
28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2006).
47
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 1 (1971).
48
See EUGENE F. SCOLES ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS § 1.1 at 1, § 1.2 at 3 (4th
ed. 2004) (The term “conflict of laws” is currently used in the United States,
England, and Canada, whereas the term “private international law” is used in
Continental Europe and by some English writers.)
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state and federal law), horizontally (between different states’ laws), 49
or between laws of a state or the United States and those of a foreign
country. 50 Choice-of-law rules establish which state’s substantive law,
or which law within a single jurisdiction, applies in a dispute. 51
Usually, the choice-of-law rule of the forum state is used to determine
which state’s law will be applied in a case. 52
The Constitution addresses both vertical and horizontal
conflicts. 53 The Supremacy Clause provides that federal law trumps
state law in conflicts between state and federal law. 54 Horizontal
interstate conflicts are addressed by the Full Faith and Credit Clause,
which provides that “Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State
to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other
State.” 55 Congress is also given the power to enact laws to regulate
state compliance with the obligations of the Full Faith and Credit
Clause, but it has rarely used this power. 56 As a result, the resolution
of interstate conflicts has generally been left to the states. 57
A significant complication in applying choice-of-law rules is the
variety of state approaches that are currently used. 58 States have the
authority to enact choice-of-law legislation, but only Louisiana and

49

Conflicts between states will be referred to as “interstate conflicts” in this
article. States involved in a conflict will be referred to as the “forum state” and the
“foreign state.”
50
SYMEONIDES, THE AMERICAN CHOICE-OF-LAW REVOLUTION, supra note 22,
¶ 4.
51
SCOLES ET AL., supra note 48, § 3.1 at 120.
52
Id.
53
SYMEONIDES, THE AMERICAN CHOICE-OF-LAW REVOLUTION, supra note 22,
¶ 4.
54
See U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
55
See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
56
SYMEONIDES, THE AMERICAN CHOICE-OF-LAW REVOLUTION, supra note 22,
¶ 4.
57
Id.
58
Michael H. Gottesman, Draining the Dismal Swamp: The Case for Federal
Choice of Law Statutes, 80 GEO. L.J. 1, 9–10 (1991).
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Oregon have enacted comprehensive statutes. 59 In the absence of
choice-of-law rules that are incorporated in specific statutes, most
courts have adopted and interpreted choice-of-law rules and
methodologies that have been developed by legal scholars. 60 A 2009
choice-of-law survey found that the fifty states, the District of
Columbia, and Puerto Rico follow five different methodologies in
contract cases and seven different methodologies in tort cases. 61
Those methodologies include: the traditional “vested rights”
approach; interest analysis; the better law approach; and the
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws (Second Restatement)
approach. 62 In addition, some states put their own gloss on the
methodologies or use a combined modern approach, in which various
aspects of different methodologies are blended. 63 Even categorizing
states by methodologies poses difficulties for leading conflict-of-laws
scholars. 64 States also often apply different methodologies in tort and
contract cases. 65 While the traditional vested rights approach has been
criticized for being too rigid, the modern choice-of-law approaches
have been criticized for being too flexible.66 The danger of too much
rigidity is a rule that requires application of state law that has an
insignificant or fortuitous connection to the dispute, while too much
flexibility results in inconsistent application of the choice-of-law
59

Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American Courts in 2009:
Twenty-Third Annual Survey, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. 227, 232–33 & n.19 (2010)
[hereinafter Symeonides, 2009 Survey].
60
SYMEONIDES, THE AMERICAN CHOICE-OF-LAW REVOLUTION, supra note 22,
¶¶ 1, 5, 310–11.
61
Symeonides, 2009 Survey, supra note 59, at 231.
62
Gardina, supra note 12, at 899–901.
63
SYMEONIDES, THE AMERICAN CHOICE-OF-LAW REVOLUTION, supra note 22,
¶¶ 59, 61, 101. The combined modern approach is described as eclecticism. Id. ¶ 61.
64
Id. ¶ 59 (“Classifying a state into a particular methodological camp is not an
exact science. Difficulties arise from a variety of sources, ranging from the lack or
dearth of authoritative precedent, to precedents that are either equivocal or
exceedingly eclectic.”).
65
Id.
66
Id. ¶¶ 368–69.
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rule. 67 Choice-of-law scholars have noted that cases decided using a
choice-of-law rule that is too flexible results in ad hoc decisionmaking, which increases litigations costs and wastes judicial
resources. 68 Perhaps most importantly, too much flexibility increases
the threat of judicial subjectivism, which challenges the public’s faith
in and the legitimacy of the legal system. 69 Most states have now
abandoned the traditional approach, at least in one area of law, for one
of the more flexible modern approaches, 70 and thus are subject to
some of the dangers that accompany choice-of-law approaches that are
too flexible.
1. The Traditional Choice-of-Law Methodology
The traditional approach to conflict of laws in the United States
can be traced back to Ulrich Huber, a seventeenth-century Dutch
scholar. 71 Huber wrote an essay, published in 1689, using the term,
“conflict of laws,” for the first time. 72 The essay included three
principles which introduced the notion of “comity” and provided the
foundation for Justice Joseph Story’s later work. 73 Huber’s principles
are:
(1) The laws of each state have force within its territory
but not beyond;
(2) These laws bind all those who are found within the
territory, whether permanently or temporarily; and
(3) Out of comity, foreign laws may be applied so that
rights acquired under them can retain their force,
67
68

Gardina, supra note 12, at 899–901.
SYMEONIDES, THE AMERICAN CHOICE-OF-LAW REVOLUTION, supra note 22,

¶ 369.
69

Id.
Symeonides, 2009 Survey, supra note 59, at 231.
71
DAVID P. CURRIE ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS 3 (7th ed. 2006).
72
SCOLES ET AL., supra note 48, § 2.5 at 14.
73
Id. § 2.5 at 14–15.
70
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provided that they do not prejudice the state’s powers
or rights. 74
Huber’s territorialist principles and the notion of comity, defined as
more than “mere courtesy,” but less than “a legal duty,” while
imprecise, began to provide a framework for determining when a
forum state will choose to apply a foreign state’s substantive laws. 75
The first two principles were dedicated to the idea of territoriality—
that a state’s laws were only effective within its territory and only
bound its citizens or visitors within its borders. 76 The third principle
contained the comity doctrine, which was an attempt to reconcile the
forum state’s sovereignty with the application of foreign law in a
particular case. 77 Although Huber’s principles were quoted in
American cases beginning by at least the late 1800s, Justice Joseph
Story’s Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws, Foreign and Domestic,
published in 1834, is credited as “the most important factor in the
spread and acceptance of the comity doctrine.” 78
During the latter half of the nineteenth century, comity was often
invoked by the courts, but it was criticized because of the inherent
difficulties in reconciling territorialist principles with the notion of
comity. 79 To reconcile territoriality with comity, critics proposed the
“vested rights” doctrine, which found the support of Professor Joseph
Beale, who wrote the American Law Institute’s Restatement (First) of
Conflict of Laws (First Restatement). 80 Beale explained the doctrine
of vested rights as follows: “‘A right having been created by the
appropriate law, the recognition of its existence should follow
everywhere. Thus an act valid where done cannot be called into
74

Id. For a translation of Huber’s essay, see Ernest G. Lorenzen, Huber’s De
Conflictu Legum, 13 ILL. L. REV. 375 (1919).
75
SCOLES ET AL., supra note 48, § 2.5 at 14.
76
Id. § 2.5 at 15.
77
Id. § 2.7 at 20.
78
Id. § 2.7 at 18.
79
Id. § 2.7 at 20.
80
Id. § 2.7 at 20–21; RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934).
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question anywhere.’” 81 Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes embraced
Beale’s “vested rights” theory in Slater v. Mexican National Railroad
Co. in 1904, 82 and the theory was incorporated into the provisions of
the First Restatement. 83 Beale’s approach, and thus the First
Restatement’s approach, is considered the traditional approach to
choice-of-law, and courts universally used Beale’s vested rights theory
until the 1950s, when modern approaches to choice-of-law began to
gain traction. 84
Under the vested rights theory, a right vests when an event occurs
in a state. 85 Different rules exist for various types of disputes, but a
single contact determines which state’s choice-of-law rule applies in
intrastate conflicts. 86 In a tort case, the court applies the law of the
state where the injury occurred.87 In a contract case, the court applies
the law of the state where the contract was made. 88 The choice-of-law
rule applied for procedural disputes is the forum state’s law, and the
rule applied for real property disputes is the law of the state where the
property is located. 89 The law of the selected jurisdiction is applied to
all substantive issues. 90

81

Id. § 2.7 at 21 (quoting JOSEPH H. BEALE, 3 CASES ON THE CONFLICT OF
LAWS 517 (1901)).
82
CURRIE ET AL., supra note 71, at 5 (citing Slater v. Mexican Nat’l R.R. Co.,
194 U.S. 120 (1904)).
83
SCOLES ET AL., supra note 48, § 2.7 at 21.
84
CURRIE ET AL., supra note 71, at 5.
85
WILLIAM L. REYNOLDS & WILLIAM M. RICHMAN, THE FULL FAITH AND
CREDIT CLAUSE: A REFERENCE GUIDE TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 20
(Jack Stark ed., Reference Guides to the U.S. Constitution, No. 15, 2005) (“The rules
are ‘jurisdiction selecting,’ which means that they select the applicable law by first
selecting a place or jurisdiction, and then applying the place’s substantive law
rule.”).
86
Id.
87
Id.
88
Id.
89
Id.
90
Id.
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A number of “escape devices” are employed by courts seeking to
avoid unfair outcomes that result from straightforward application of
traditional choice-of-law rules. 91 Escape devices are tools that allow a
court to select a different law than would have been applied using one
of the rigid choice-of-law rules under the traditional approach. 92
Characterization, renvoi and the public policy exception are escape
devices used by courts. 93 If a dispute has both contract and tort issues,
and deciding the case under the contract rule results in a harsh
outcome, the court can re-characterize the contract case as a tort case
to allow application of another state’s law. 94 Courts can also
characterize issues as procedural instead of substantive. 95 Renvoi is a
legal principle that, when applied, results in a perpetual loop where the
forum court adopts the foreign state’s “whole” law, its substantive law,
and choice-of-law rules, which then refer the court back to the
substantive law of the forum. 96 The forum court can refuse to consider
the foreign state’s choice-of-law rules and “reject” the renvoi or accept
the foreign state’s choice-of-law rules and “accept” the renvoi. 97 If the
court accepts the renvoi and the foreign state’s choice-of-law rules
refer back to the forum state’s law, there is “remission.” 98 If the
foreign state’s choice-of-law rules refer to a third state’s substantive
law, there is “transmission.” 99 Another escape device is the public

91

Id. at 21.
Id. (stating that “[escape devices] permit the court to manipulate among
supposedly readily apparent choices in order to reach a desired result.”)
93
Id.
94
Id.; see Levy v. Daniels’ U-Drive Auto Renting Co., Inc. 108 Conn. 333
(1928) (characterizing an action to recover damages by a passenger in a rented car to
be a contract action instead of a tort action, which allowed the passenger to recover
damages from the rental company under Connecticut law).
95
SYMEONIDES, THE AMERICAN CHOICE-OF-LAW REVOLUTION, supra note 22,
¶ 40.
96
CURRIE ET AL., supra note 71, at 64.
97
Id.
98
Id. at 65.
99
Id.
92
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policy exception, which was recognized in the First Restatement. 100
Section 612 states that “[n]o action can be maintained upon a cause of
action created in another state the enforcement of which is contrary to
the strong public policy of the forum.” 101 Thus, if the court finds that
the selected substantive law is repugnant to the public policy of the
forum state, it can instead apply its own law. 102
The First Restatement’s choice-of-law system was criticized as
being mechanical, rigid, and overly reliant on the principles of
territorialism and vested rights. 103 The use of escape devices
demonstrates that, in at least some cases, those criticisms were valid.
The virtues that have been attributed to the traditional system—
predictability, simplicity, and forum neutrality—were negated by the
use of escape devices. 104 There was no attempt under the traditional
approach to consider the purposes and policies behind the conflicting
substantive laws, nor were the parties’ expectations taken into
consideration. 105 Thus, the traditional approach resulted in application
of the substantive law of a state that had a tenuous interest in the
dispute, was unduly harsh, or defeated the parties’ expectations. 106

100

RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 612.
Id .
102
In re Guevara, 409 B.R. 442 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2009) (holding that a Texas
debtor’s $20,000 gambling debt owed to a Louisiana casino under a gambling
“marker” was not an enforceable bankruptcy claim because gambling on credit was
contrary to Texas public policy).
103
SYMEONIDES, THE AMERICAN CHOICE-OF-LAW REVOLUTION, supra note
22, ¶ 9.
104
REYNOLDS & RICHMAN, supra note 85, at 21.
105
SYMEONIDES, THE AMERICAN CHOICE-OF-LAW REVOLUTION, supra note
22, ¶ 9. (“[The traditional rules] completely sacrificed flexibility on the altar of
certainty and, in the pursuit of an ill-conceived theoretical purity, they ignored the
lessons of experience. They chose not among laws, but among states, based solely on
a single, predesignated, territorial, or other factual contact. Subject only to limited
post-choice exceptions, the chosen law applied almost automatically, regardless of
its content, its underlying policy, or the substantive quality of the solution it would
bring to the case at hand.”)
106
REYNOLDS & RICHMAN, supra note 85, at 20.
101
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Modern choice-of-law methodologies were developed in part to
achieve sensible results without the need to resort to escape devices. 107
2. Modern Choice-of-Law Methodologies
The development of the modern approaches has been called a
“revolution” because the “intellectual movement . . . challenged and
eventually demolished the foundations of the established American
system of conflicts law.” 108 Professor Brainerd Currie pioneered a
comprehensive alternative approach to the vested rights theory in the
1950s and 1960s. 109 Currie’s approach is known as “interest
analysis.” 110 Under Currie’s methodology, generally the law of the
forum state should be applied. 111 However, if the parties argued for
application of a foreign state’s law:
[T]he court should first of all determine the
governmental policy . . . that is expressed by the law of
the forum. The court should then inquire whether the
relationship of the forum state to the case at bar . . . is
such as to bring the case within the scope of the state’s
governmental concern, and to provide a legitimate basis
for the assertion that the state has an interest in the
application of its policy in this instance. 112
The court should then engage in the same analysis of the foreign
state’s law and governmental policy and determine whether the
107
108

SCOLES ET AL., supra note 48, § 17.8 at 723–24.
SYMEONIDES, THE AMERICAN CHOICE-OF-LAW REVOLUTION, supra note

22, ¶ 1.
109

Id. ¶ 14.
REYNOLDS & RICHMAN, supra note 85, at 22–23.
111
BRAINERD CURRIE, The Constitution and the Choice of Law: Governmental
Interests and the Judicial Function, in SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS
188, 188 (1963).
112
Id. at 189.
110
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foreign state has an interest in application of its law. 113 Through this
analysis of governmental interests, the court determines which state’s
law should be applied. 114
There are three generally recognized categories of conflicts that
result from interest analysis: a “true conflict,” where more than one
state is interested in applying its law; a “false conflict,” where only
one state is interested; or an “unprovided-for case,” where no state is
interested. 115 If a true conflict arose in an interested forum, Currie
argued the law of the forum should be applied; however, in a
disinterested forum, Currie advocated the dismissal of the case on
forum non conveniens grounds or application of the forum’s law, if
dismissal was impossible. 116 If the conflict was false, Currie argued
the law of the only interested state, usually the forum state, should be
applied. 117 Finally, under Currie’s approach for unprovided-for cases,
the law of the forum is applied. 118
The main criticism and difficulty that plagues interest analysis is
identifying the purpose behind a state’s law. 119 Often, there are
multiple and complex purposes and policies underlying a substantive
law, and for practical reasons, a court’s analysis may stop after
identifying only one purpose. Furthermore, Currie’s analysis most
often results in application of the forum’s law, and thus, interest
analysis is criticized as favoring the application of forum law. 120 Thus,
applying the forum state’s law to resolve true conflicts encourages
forum shopping. 121

113

Id.
Id. at 188–89.
115
SYMEONIDES, THE AMERICAN CHOICE-OF-LAW REVOLUTION, supra note
22, ¶ 19.
116
Id. ¶ 21 & n.60.
117
Id. ¶ 20.
118
Id. ¶ 22.
119
Id. ¶ 22.
120
Id. ¶ 23.
121
CURRIE ET AL., supra note 71, at 181.
114
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Some courts use a “moderate and restrained” approach or the
principle of “comparative impairment” to address the forum-favoring
approach of interest analysis in true conflicts. Using the moderate and
restrained approach, a court dissolves a true conflict by finding a false
conflict, so that only one state is interested in having its law
applied. 122 The court finds a false conflict by narrowly reading the
law to find its purposes and finds those purposes inapplicable to the
case. 123 The “comparative impairment” approach, proposed by
Professor William F. Baxter, considers the interests of the forum state
and foreign state in having their law applied and determines which
state’s policies would be impaired more if subordinated. 124 The law of
the state whose interests would be most impaired is then applied. 125
In the 1960s, Professor Robert A. Leflar weighed in on the
choice-of-law revolution and outlined five considerations for courts to
use in deciding conflicts cases. 126 Those choice-influencing
considerations are: (1) predictability of results; (2) maintenance of
interstate and international order; (3) simplification of the judicial
task; (4) advancement of the forum’s governmental interests; and (5)
application of the “better rule of law.” 127 Leflar stated that no priority
among the considerations should be inferred from the chronological
order of the list. 128 However, he also stated that the better rule of law
would be “more important in some types of cases than in others,

122

Id. at 185.
Judge Traynor used the moderate and restrained approach in Bernkrant v.
Fowler, 360 P.2d 906 (Cal. 1961), to find a false conflict, and he subordinated
California’s interests because of the parties’ expectations that Nevada law would
apply to an oral contract. Thus, the court determined that only Nevada had an
interest in having its law applied.
124
SYMEONIDES, THE AMERICAN CHOICE-OF-LAW REVOLUTION, supra note
22, ¶¶ 25–26.
125
Id. ¶ 25.
126
CURRIE ET AL., supra note 71, at 228–31.
127
ROBERT A. LEFLAR ET AL., AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW § 95 at 279 (4th ed.
1986).
128
Id. at § 95 at 278
123
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almost controlling in some but irrelevant in others.” 129 Leflar’s better
law approach has been criticized for “becoming a euphemism for a
[forum law] approach[] and . . . providing convenient cover for
judicial subjectivism.” 130 While commentators have suggested that
application of the forum law usually results from the better law
approach, two empirical studies, limited to tort cases, have found that
the better law approach leads to application of the forum’s law no
more often than the other modern approaches.131
The Second Restatement approach was developed in the wake of
the various methodologies that had been created because of the
deficiencies that courts had found using the vested rights approach
adopted in the First Restatement. 132 The foundation of the Second
Restatement approach is provided by the factors for choosing the
applicable rule of law articulated in Section 6. 133 Section 6 states that a
court should follow its own state’s choice-of-law statute and, in the
absence of a statute, consider the following factors: (1) the needs of
the interstate and international systems; (2) the relevant policies of the
forum; (3) the relevant policies of other interested states and the
relative interests of those states in the determination of the particular
issue; (4) the protection of justified expectations; (5) the basic policies
underlying the particular field of law; (6) certainty, predictability, and
uniformity of result; and (7) ease in the determination and application
of the law to be applied. 134 Section 6 is incorporated by reference into
the provisions that deal with specific issues such as contract and tort
cases, and the general overriding principle is that the law of the state
with the “most significant relationship” to the dispute and the parties,
as determined under the factors listed in Section 6, should be
129
130

Id. at § 107 at 300.
SYMEONIDES, THE AMERICAN CHOICE-OF-LAW REVOLUTION, supra note

22, ¶ 29.
131
132

CURRIE ET AL., supra note 71, at 240, 241 n.4.
SYMEONIDES, THE AMERICAN CHOICE-OF-LAW REVOLUTION, supra note

22, ¶ 32.
133
134

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6.
Id.
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applied. 135 In addition, the Second Restatement includes provisions
that deal with specific issues and instructs courts on the type of
contacts that are determinative in resolving state law conflicts. For
example, Section 188 states that courts determining the rights and
duties of parties under a contract without an effective choice-of-law
provision should take into account the following contacts: the place of
contracting; the place of negotiation; the place of performance; the
location of the subject matter of the contract; and the domicile,
residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of business of
the parties. 136
Despite the fact that the Second Restatement has been adopted by
many courts, it has been criticized for providing a “laundry list” of
factors for the courts to consider that results in flexible, open-ended
analysis. 137 Critics have also noted that courts following the Second
Restatement simply come to their own conclusions on choice-of-law
questions. 138 The Second Restatement allows courts this flexibility
with its “tentative near rules, nonrules that use[] a soft ‘most
significant relationship’ connecting factor, as well as state ‘interests’
and ‘policies.’” 139 The practical upshot is that the Second Restatement
is viewed as a “mishmash” of the various choice-of-law
methodologies, which allows judges not to be “bound by any hard and
fast rules, which inevitably prompt[s] undesirable outcomes in
interstate and international cases.” 140

135

Id. §§ 145, 188.
Id. § 188.
137
CURRIE ET AL., supra note 71, at 206, 228.
138
Juenger, supra note 22, at 405–06 (“In a way, [the Second Restatement]
was a non-Restatement: by mixing together all manner of doctrinal currents, it
simply furnished the courts with any number of plausible reasons to support
whatever results they wished to reach. That, no doubt, is the principal reason why
judges like it and academics detest it.”).
139
CURRIE ET AL., supra note 71, at 226–27; Juenger, supra note 22, at 405.
140
Juenger, supra note 22, at 405.
136

329
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2010

21

Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 5, Iss. 2 [2010], Art. 3

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 5, Issue 2

Spring 2010

II. APPLICATION OF CHOICE-OF-LAW RULES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS
A. Origins of the Current Circuit Split
In Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Manufacturing Co., 141 the
Supreme Court extended the holding of Erie Railroad Co. v.
Tompkins 142 to choice-of-law rules. The Klaxon Court held that
federal courts exercising jurisdiction by virtue of diversity of
citizenship must apply the choice-of-law rules of the state in which the
federal court is located. 143 However, the Supreme Court has never
expressly extended the holding of Klaxon to federal question cases.
Further muddying the waters is the Supreme Court’s dicta in Vanston
Bondholders Protective Committee v. Green, which seems to suggest
that a federal choice-of-law rule may make the most sense in
bankruptcy cases, where there are often significant contacts in many
states. 144 As a result, there is a split among the U.S. Courts of Appeals
and confusion in the district and bankruptcy courts as to whether state
or federal choice-of-law rules apply. 145
141

313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941) (stating that “[o]therwise, the accident of
diversity of citizenship would constantly disturb equal administration of justice in
coordinate state and federal courts sitting side by side”).
142
304 U.S. 64, 77–79 (1938). In Erie, the Supreme Court held that a federal
court exercising diversity jurisdiction must apply state common law and declared
that “[t]here is no federal general common law.” Id. at 78. In doing so, the Court
overruled Swift v. Tyson, under which federal courts sitting in diversity had been able
to ignore the declarations of the state’s highest court and instead use their own
judgment to determine what a state’s common law was. 41 U.S. 1 (1842).
143
313 U.S. at 496.
144
329 U.S. 156, 161–62 (1946), reh’g denied, 329 U.S. 833 (1947).
145
Compare In re Teleglobe Commc’ns Corp., 493 F.3d 345, 358 (3d Cir.
2007) (concluding state choice-of-law rules apply in bankruptcy cases), In re Gaston
& Snow, 243 F.3d 599 (2d Cir. 2001) (holding that bankruptcy courts should apply
the choice-of-law rules of the forum state in the absence of a significant federal
interest), In re Payless Cashways, 203 F.3d 1081 (8th Cir. 2000) (stating that the
bankruptcy court applies the forum state’s choice-of-law rules), and In re Merritt
Dredging Co., Inc., 839 F.2d 203 (4th Cir. 1988) (stating that in the absence of a
compelling federal interest, the court should apply the forum state’s choice-of-law
rule to determine a debtor’s property interest in the property of the estate), with In re
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A few years after Klaxon, in D’Oench, Duhme & Co. v. Federal
Deposit Insurance Corp., the Supreme Court declined to determine
whether Klaxon applies when jurisdiction is based on a federal
question. 146 In Justice Jackson’s concurrence in D’Oench, he noted
that Erie had not been extended to federal question cases and also
stated that he “[did] not understand Justice Brandeis’s statement in
Erie . . . that ‘[t]here is no federal general common law,’ to deny that
the common law may in proper cases be an aid to, or the basis of,
decision of federal questions.” 147 Shortly thereafter, the Supreme
Court declined to decide whether Klaxon applied to federal question
cases in Vanston, a bankruptcy case. 148 However, the Supreme Court
decided not to apply state law to uphold an interest on interest
bankruptcy claim on the basis of “the equitable principles governing
bankruptcy distributions.” 149 In addition, the Court stated that:
[O]bligations, such as the one here for interest, often
have significant contacts in many states, so that the
question of which particular state’s law should measure
the obligation seldom lends itself to simple solution. In
determining which contact is the most significant in a
particular transaction, courts can seldom find a
complete solution in the mechanical formulae of the
conflicts of law. Determination requires the exercise of
an informed judgment in the balancing of all the
Vortex Fishing Sys., Inc., 277 F.3d 1057 (9th Cir. 2002) (stating that federal choiceof-law rules must be applied in bankruptcy cases), In re Lindsay, 59 F.3d 942 (9th
Cir. 1995) (stating that federal choice-of-law rules should be applied in bankruptcy
cases), In re SMEC, Inc., 160 B.R. 86 (M.D. Tenn. 1993) (applying an independent,
federal choice-of-law rule in a legal malpractice action filed by the Chapter 7 trustee
on behalf of the bankruptcy estate), and In re Cyrus II P’ship, 413 B.R. 609 (Bankr.
S.D. Tex. 2008) (concluding that federal choice-of-law rules should apply to
fraudulent conveyance claims in bankruptcy).
146
315 U.S. 447, 456 (1942), reh’g denied, 315 U.S. 830 (1942).
147
Id. at 467, 469–70 (Jackson, J., concurring).
148
329 U.S. at 162–63.
149
Id. at 163.
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interests of the states with the most significant contacts
in order best to accommodate the equities among the
parties to the policies of those states. 150
This dicta has intrigued the courts and has been interpreted to
indicate support for a federal common law choice-of-law rule in
bankruptcy cases. 151
B. The Circuit Split
The Supreme Court has remained silent on the issue of whether
state conflict-of-law rules should apply in federal question cases since
Vanston was decided, and as a result, the federal courts have splintered
into three groups. The First and Ninth Circuits, a bankruptcy court
within the Fifth Circuit, and a district court within the Sixth Circuit
have concluded that federal common law choice-of-law rules apply in
federal question cases. 152 Courts applying a federal common law
choice-of-law rule for bankruptcy cases use the Second Restatement’s
approach. 153 The Third, Eighth, and D.C. Circuits have determined
that state choice-of-law rules apply. 154 The Second and Fourth Circuits
150

Id. at 161-62.
In re SMEC, Inc., 160 B.R. 86, 90 (M.D. Tenn. 1993) (stating that “several
courts have taken these statements as strong evidence of how the [Supreme] Court
would rule on the conflicts question if unavoidably confronted with it.”)
152
In re Vortex Fishing Sys, 277 F.3d 1057, 1069 (9th Cir. 2002) (bankruptcy
case); Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs v. Springfield Terminal Ry. Co., 210 F.3d 18, 25–
26 (1st Cir. 2000) (Railway Labor Act); In re Lindsay, 59 F.3d 942, 948 (9th Cir.
1995) (bankruptcy case); Chuidian v. Philippine Nat’l Bank, 976 F.2d 561, 564 (9th
Cir. 1992) (Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act); Edelman v. Chase Manhattan Bank,
861 F.2d 1291, 1294 (1st Cir. 1988) (Edge Act); In re Cyrus II P’ship, 413 B.R. 609,
613–14 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2008) (bankruptcy case); In re SMEC, Inc., 160 B.R. 86,
89–91 (M.D. Tenn. 1993) (bankruptcy case).
153
Gardina, supra note 12, at 910.
154
See In re Teleglobe Commc’n, 493 F.3d 345, 358 (3d Cir. 2007)
(bankruptcy case); In re Payless Cashways, 203 F.3d 1081, 1084 (8th Cir. 2000)
(bankruptcy case); FDIC v. Nordbrock, 102 F.2d 335, 337 (8th Cir. 1996)
(FIRREA); A.I. Trade Fin., Inc. v. Petra Int’l Banking Corp., 62 F.3d 1454, 1464–65
151
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have concluded that the forum state’s choice-of-law rules should apply
in the absence of a compelling federal interest.155 However, some of
the federal courts cannot be clearly placed in one group. The Fifth
Circuit has declined to decide the issue twice 156 but has stated that
“[w]hen disposition of a federal question requires reference to state
law, federal courts are not bound by the forum state’s choice-of-law
rules, but are free to apply the law considered relevant to the pending
controversy.” 157 The Seventh Circuit, on the other hand, has taken
inconsistent positions in federal question cases. The confusion has led
one bankruptcy court to decline to adopt a particular approach and
instead analyze the choice-of-law question under all three
approaches. 158
C. The Seventh Circuit’s Approach in Bankruptcy and Other Federal
Question Cases
The Seventh Circuit has applied state choice-of-law rules in
bankruptcy cases. 159 In In re Iowa Railroad Co., the Seventh Circuit
(D.C. Cir. 1995) (Edge Act); Carlson v. Tandy Computer Leasing, 803 F.2d 391,
393 (8th Cir. 1986) (bankruptcy).
155
See In re Gaston & Snow, 243 F.3d 599, 606–07 (bankruptcy); In re Merritt
Dredging Co., Inc., 839 F.2d 203, 206 (bankruptcy); but see Detroit Edison Co. v.
Pac. Ins. Co., 742 F. Supp. 287, 289 (M.D.N.C. 1990) (concluding that a federal
common law choice-of-law rule should be applied in a federal question case under
the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act),
aff’d , 944 F.2d 901 (4th Cir. 1991).
156
Woods-Tucker Leasing Corp. of Ga. v. Hutcheson-Ingram Dev. Co., 642
F.2d 744, 748–49 (5th Cir. 1981) (bankruptcy); Fahs v. Martin, 224 F.2d 387, 396
(5th Cir. 1955).
157
In re Crist, 632 F.2d 1226, 1229 (5th Cir. 1980) (bankruptcy case).
158
In re Friedlander Capital Mgmt. Corp., 411 B.R. 434, 441–43 (Bankr. S.D.
Fla. 2009) (“Because the result is the same under the three approaches discussed
below, the Court declines to adopt a particular approach in this case.”).
159
See In re Jafari, 569 F.3d 644, 649 (7th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S.Ct.
1077 (2010) (concluding that the court need not answer the choice-of-law question
because the application of the federal common law approach produced the same
result as the application of Wisconsin choice-of-law principles); Fogel v. Zell, 221
F.3d 955, 966 (7th Cir. 2000) (applying a state choice-of-law rule but noting the
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simply followed the holding of Klaxon and applied Illinois choice-oflaw rules because the court sits in Chicago, Illinois. 160 The court
acknowledged the circuit split in In re Morris but applied Illinois
choice-of-law rules, which dictated the use of Iowa substantive law. 161
In Fogel v. Zell, the court noted the split and then applied Illinois
choice-of-law rules. 162 However, in other federal question cases, the
court has applied federal choice-of-law principles. 163
In Resolution Trust Corp. v. Chapman, the Resolution Trust
Corporation brought a negligence action against the former directors
and officers of a federally chartered savings and loan under a federal
law, the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement
Act of 1989 (FIRREA). 164 The court explicitly stated that the choiceof-law question was a federal one in Chapman, a non-diversity
case. 165 Although Atherton v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. later
overruled the primary holding of Chapman, the Seventh Circuit has
stated that “[t]he ruling on choice-of-law, however, presumably

persistent circuit split); In re Morris, 30 F.3d 1578, 1582 (7th Cir. 1994)
(recognizing the circuit split but declining to resolve it because both the forum
state’s choice-of-law rules and the federal common law choice-of-law rule came to
the same conclusion); In re Iowa R.R. Co., 840 F.2d 535, 543 (7th Cir. 1988)
(applying a state choice-of-law rule in a bankruptcy case and stating that “federal
courts refer to the ‘whole law’ of the forum state” ).
160
840 F.2d at 542–43.
161
30 F.3d at 1582. In re Morris illustrates how characterization can determine
the outcome of a case. The bankruptcy trustee argued that the issue was the validity
or effect of conveyance of real estate; however, the Seventh Circuit agreed with the
bankruptcy and district courts that the relevant issue was the corporation’s existence
and legal capacity. Id. If the Illinois choice-of-law rule for resolving questions about
the validity or effect of a conveyance had been applied, Illinois substantive law
would have been selected since the land in question was located in Illinois. Id.
162
221 F.3d at 966.
163
Resolution Trust Corp. v. Chapman, 29 F.3d 1120 (7th Cir. 1994), reh’g en
banc denied (7th Cir. 1994), overruled by Atherton v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 519
U.S. 213 (1997); Berger v. AXA Network LLC, 459 F.3d 804 (7th Cir. 2006).
164
29 F.3d at 1124.
165
Id.
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remains controlling precedent.” 166 Most recently in 2006, the court
applied a federal choice-of-law rule in Berger v. AXA Network LLC, a
case where the underlying claim was based on the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA). 167 The parties in Berger
disagreed as to whether Illinois or New York law supplied the
applicable statute of limitations period for the action where one was
not provided in the applicable ERISA provision. 168 In discussing the
choice-of-law issue, the court stated “[w]hat law Illinois courts would
choose is . . . irrelevant. This is not a diversity case, where Erie would
require the forum court to apply the whole law of the state, including
its choice of law principles.” 169 Additionally, the court stated that:
In fashioning a choice of law rule to govern our quest
for the most appropriate state limitations period, our
task, when the underlying claim is a federal claim, is to
fashion a federal choice of law rule. This principle is
really nothing more than a corollary principle to the
more general maxim that, when state law is borrowed
in a federal question suit, the choice of ‘which [state]
law to select is itself a question of federal law.’ 170

166

Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Wabick, 335 F.3d 620, 625 n.2 (7th Cir. 2003).
In Wabick, a case brought by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC)
under FIRREA, the court was faced with the question of whether the federal statute
or Illinois’ substantive law provided the applicable statute of limitations. Id. at 622,
626. The district court, using federal common law choice-of-law rules, determined
that Washington, D.C.’s statute of limitations applied. Id. at 624. The Seventh
Circuit reversed because it found that the question was resolved by the statute itself,
which directed the court to apply the forum state’s choice-of-law principles. Id. at
627–28. The Court recognized that by applying state choice-of-law rules in Wabick,
it was taking a different position than the one it had taken in Resolution Trust Corp.
Id. at 625.
167
459 F.3d at 805, 809–10.
168
Id. at 809.
169
Id. at 810.
170
Id. at 809–10 (quoting Resolution Trust Corp. v. Chapman, 29 F.3d 1120,
1124 (7th Cir. 1994)) (emphasis in original).
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The court went on to reason that “the exercise of federal question
jurisdiction does not implicate concerns of federalism and interstate
comity.” 171 Thus, the Seventh Circuit has stated that application of
federal choice-of-law principles is appropriate in cases where the court
is exercising federal question jurisdiction. It is unclear why the court’s
strong endorsement of federal choice-of-law rules in some federal
question cases has not extended to bankruptcy cases.
D. In re Jafari
The Seventh Circuit recently had an opportunity to decide
whether state choice-of-law rules or a federal common law choice-oflaw rule applies in bankruptcy in In re Jafari. 172 Unfortunately, the
court did little more than provide an outline of the circuit split that
presently exists. 173 In Jafari, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the
conclusion of the bankruptcy court that Wisconsin choice-of-law rules
applied and that under Wisconsin’s “grouping of contacts” rule for
contractual disputes, Nevada law applied to the claims of the
creditors. 174 As a result, the creditors’ claims were allowed under
Nevada law. 175
The debtor, Robert Jafari, was a gambling addict whose gambling
debts ultimately cost him his job and led to his filing a Chapter 11
bankruptcy petition. 176 Despite being bailed out of roughly $3,000,000
in gambling debts by his father before 2005, Jafari continued to
gamble. 177 In 2005, Jafari, a Wisconsin resident, traveled to Las
Vegas, Nevada, to gamble, and a credit line was approved for Jafari by
171
172

Id. at 810.
In re Jafari, 569 F.3d 644, 649 (7th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S.Ct. 1077

(2010).
173

Id. at 648–49.
Id. at 649–51.
175
Id. at 651.
176
In re Jafari (Jafari III), 378 B.R. 575, 578–79 (Bankr. W.D. Wisc. 2007),
rev’d, In re Jafari (Jafari II) 385 B.R. 262 (W.D. Wisc. 2008), aff’d, In re Jafari, 569
F.3d 644.
177
In re Jafari, 569 F.3d at 646.
174
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casino developer Steve Wynn for use at his casino. 178 Jafari made trips
to Las Vegas to gamble at the Wynn and other casinos numerous times
in 2005. 179 In September 2005, Jafari executed with the Wynn a new
credit agreement, also known as a “marker,” with an initial line of
credit of $150,000, then executed subsequent credit line increase
requests, bringing his total line of credit to $1,000,000. 180
During September 2005, another Las Vegas casino, Caesar’s, also
extended credit totaling $250,000 to Jafari. 181 Jafari failed to repay the
credit advance, so Wynn and Caesar’s presented their markers for
payment against his bank account. 182 Payment was denied, so both
Wynn and Caesar’s filed suit against Jafari in Nevada district court. 183
Two days before his answer was due in the Nevada case, Jafari and his
wife filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition in Wisconsin, which
stayed the Nevada lawsuit. 184 Wynn and Caesar’s then filed timely
proofs of claim in the bankruptcy court, to which the Jafaris and the
bankruptcy trustee objected. 185 Wynn’s proof of claim was for over
$1.2 million, and Caesar’s was for $250,000. 186 The Jafaris and the
bankruptcy trustee argued that under the Wisconsin Anti-Gaming
Statute, the gambling debts could not be enforced. 187 Thus, the
bankruptcy court had to decide whether to allow or disallow the
casinos’ claims. 188 Concluding that it was required to apply
Wisconsin’s choice-of-law rules instead of federal common law
choice-of-law rules, the bankruptcy court disallowed the claims
because it determined that the claims for gambling debts were
178

Id.
Id.
180
Id.
181
Id.
182
Id.
183
Id.
184
Id.
185
Id. at 646–47.
186
Id. at 646.
187
Id. at 647.
188
Id.
179
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unenforceable under Wisconsin’s Anti-Gaming Statute, which states
that gaming contracts are void. 189 Wynn and Caesar’s appealed to the
U.S. District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin, which
reversed the bankruptcy court’s holding and declined to decide
whether Wisconsin’s choice-of-law rules or the federal common law
choice-of-law rules applied. 190 The district court determined that
Nevada substantive law would apply to determine if the credit
agreements were enforceable under either Wisconsin choice-of-law
rules or the federal common law choice-of-law rules. 191 Upon remand,
the bankruptcy court applied Nevada law and determined that the
claims were allowable. 192
On appeal, Jafari argued that the forum state’s choice-of-law rules
should be applied in the absence of a compelling federal policy or
interest. 193 Applying Wisconsin’s choice-of-law rule, Jafari argued,
would result in Wisconsin substantive law applying and the casino’s
claims being disallowed due to Wisconsin’s strong public policy
interest in applying its anti-gambling statute. 194 The casinos argued
that because of the need for uniformity in bankruptcy case
administration, the bankruptcy court must apply federal common law
choice-of-law rules. 195 Under their analysis, the casinos stated that
Nevada law would apply. 196 In the alternative, the casinos argued that
even if the bankruptcy court was required to apply Wisconsin’s
choice-of-law rules, Nevada law would be selected because of Jafari’s
numerous contacts with Nevada. 197
The Seventh Circuit determined that if the same outcome would
result under application of either Wisconsin choice-of-law principles
189

Id.
Id.
191
Id.
192
Id.
193
Id.
194
Id. 647–48.
195
Id. at 648.
196
Id.
197
Id.
190
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or the federal common law choice-of-law approach, there was no need
for the court to resolve the question as to which choice-of-law rules
should be applied in bankruptcy cases. 198 The court then applied
Wisconsin’s choice-of-law rule for contracts and determined that the
significant contacts in the Jafari case favored the selection of Nevada
law. 199 The court further determined that a Wisconsin court would not
have applied the public policy exception. 200
III. ANALYSIS
A. Policy Concerns in Bankruptcy
The outcome of the Jafari case is unremarkable. Using most
choice-of-law methodologies, the facts in Jafari would have led to the
application of Nevada law. In addition, the credit agreements that
Jafari had signed with the casinos contained statements that Nevada
law would apply in the case of a dispute, although the Seventh Circuit
did not address this fact. 201 The court was able to avoid making a
difficult decision on the choice-of-law issue because Nevada law was
selected by applying either Wisconsin’s choice-of-law rules or the
federal choice-of-law principles. Consequently, the Seventh Circuit
did not meaningfully address the circuit split, why it has chosen to
apply federal choice-of-law rules in other federal question cases, or the
policy concerns, such as uniformity, that are unique to bankruptcy.
As the Jafari district court opinion noted, “a federal bankruptcy
court is in an unusual position. Its jurisdiction arises not from
diversity, but from federal bankruptcy law, which has a goal of
national uniformity, rather than congruence with state law.” 202 As
discussed in Part I.A., Congress was empowered to enact uniform
198

Id. at 649.
Id. at 650.
200
Id. at 650–51.
201
Jafari II, 385 B.R. 262, 265 (W.D. Wisc. 2008), aff’d, 569 F.3d 644, cert.
denied, 130 S.Ct. 1077 (2010).
202
Id. at 266.
199
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bankruptcy laws under the Bankruptcy Clause, and as Madison wrote
in The Federalist No. 42, uniform bankruptcy laws were necessary to
deal with the problems that would arise in bankruptcy cases where the
debtor and creditors were from different states.
Courts are faced with the “special bankruptcy problems of
uniformity, ratable distribution and fairness and equity which grow out
of the context of the bankruptcy law.” 203 However, application of
various state choice-of-law rules yields inconsistent results, which are
at odds with the goal of uniformity in bankruptcy. In addition, state
choice-of law rules, which favor the forum, can result in selection of
substantive law with a tenuous connection to the dispute and parties.
Finally, liberal bankruptcy venue rules and favorable state law invites
interstate forum shopping.
1. Substantive Law with a Tenuous Connection to the Dispute and
Parties
Application of state choice-of-law rules in bankruptcy can result
in selection of the substantive law of a state that has little or no
connection with the dispute. In re Gaston & Snow, a case often cited
for its discussion of the circuit split over choice-of-law rules in
bankruptcy cases, is an example of a case where the law of New York,
which had almost no connection to the dispute, was selected by
application of New York’s choice-of-law rules. 204 Gaston & Snow (G
& S) was a law firm that had gone into bankruptcy. 205 G & S’s
bankruptcy estate administrator filed an adversary proceeding in New
York against a client, Robert Erkins, to recover $1.7 million for legal
services that had allegedly been performed for Erkins. 206 Erkins, an
Idaho businessman, had hired G & S, a Boston, Massachusetts, firm,
203

Vanston Bondholders Protective Comm. v. Green, 329 U.S. 156, 165 n.9
(1946), reh’g denied, 329 U.S. 833 (1947).
204
In re Gaston & Snow, 243 F.3d 599, 605–07 (2d Cir. 2001), cert. denied,
543 U.S. 1042 (2001).
205
Id. at 602. An involuntary chapter 11 bankruptcy petition had been filed
against G & S, so the firm did not engage in forum shopping in this case.
206
Id. at 602-03.
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to represent him in litigation in Idaho based on an oral agreement, the
terms of which were in dispute. 207 G & S had a satellite office in New
York, but its Boston-based attorneys represented Erkins. 208
Application of Idaho’s statute of limitations period of four years would
have barred the oral contract claim, whereas the claim would have
been valid under application of the New York six-year statute of
limitations period. 209 The Second Circuit applied New York’s choiceof-law rule for contract cases, which requires selecting the state that
has the greatest interest in the case by determining which jurisdiction
has the most contacts with the litigation. 210 The court acknowledged
that “New York’s relationship to the action is insignificant compared
to Idaho’s.” 211 None of the business transacted between Erkins and G
& S occurred in New York. 212 However, New York also had a
borrowing statute, which required application of the New York statute
of limitations period when “‘the cause of action accrued in favor of a
resident of the state.’” 213 Thus, the court found that New York’s
statute of limitations applied. 214 The court acknowledged the
defendant’s argument that the cause of action did not accrue in favor
of the bankruptcy administrator, a New York resident, and that G & S
was not a New York resident; however, the defendants did not raise
that argument below, and the court declined to consider the argument
on appeal. 215 Gaston is a clear example of the forum-favoring nature

207

Id. at 602.
Id. at 602–03.
209
Id. at 604.
210
Id. at 607–08.
211
Id. at 605.
212
Id. at 602.
213
Id. at 604 (citing N.Y. Civil Practice Law and Rules § 202 (1993)).
214
Id. at 608–09.
215
Id. at 608. The court also stated that the defendant’s argument was “quite
dubious,” and under New York law, “[a] nonresident’s contract claim accrues where
the nonresident resides.” Id. at 608 n.7. Further, the court stated that G & S’s
residence was Massachusetts, under which a six-year statute of limitations would
have been applied. Id. 608 n.3.
208
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of some choice-of-law rules and how the law of a state with little
connection to the dispute may nevertheless be selected.
2. Interstate Forum Shopping
Intrastate forum shopping between federal and state courts, the
very evil that the Supreme Court was trying to prevent by requiring
federal courts sitting in diversity to apply state choice-of-law rules, 216
is not the issue in bankruptcy cases. As the Ninth Circuit stated, “[i]n
[federal question] cases, the risk of forum shopping which is avoided
by applying state law has no application, because the case can only be
litigated in federal court. The value of national uniformity of approach
need not be subordinated, therefore, to differences in state choice of
law rules.” 217 By contrast, application of state choice-of-law rules
invites interstate forum shopping. In fact, overruling Klaxon has been
advocated for several reasons, including the fact that Klaxon
encourages interstate forum shopping under the current system in
which states provide a variety of choice-of-law approaches. 218
216

See Ferens v. John Deere Co., 494 U.S. 516, 534–35 (1990) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (“The goal of Erie and Klaxon . . . was to prevent “forum shopping” as
between state and federal systems . . . .”)
217
In re Lindsay, 59 F.3d 942, 948 (2d Cir. 1995).
218
See Fruehwald, supra note 3, at 36–39. Fruehwald argues that Klaxon
should be overruled:
Although this article proposes Erie is constitutionally required and
necessary for practical reasons, the same does not apply to Klaxon.
First, Klaxon was a poorly-reasoned decision that is supported on a
single ground—the dangers of intrastate forum shopping. Second,
because of the numerous state choice of law approaches that exist
today, Klaxon encourages interstate forum shopping for favorable
law. Third, Klaxon ignores the fact that choice of law is a
multistate process that should not be restricted by parochial state
conflicts rules. Fourth, Klaxon often encourages, rather than
discourages, intrastate forum shopping. Finally, Klaxon produces
absurd results in some cases.
Id. at 36.
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In his dissenting opinion in Ferens v. John Deere Co., Justice
Scalia wrote that forum shopping was invited not only by more
generous statute of limitations available under various state laws, but
also by the variety of state choice-of-law rules. 219 In Ferens, the
Supreme Court held that following a transfer under 28 U.S. § 1404(a)
initiated by the plaintiff, the transferee court must apply the choice-oflaw rules applied in the transferor court. 220 This holding allowed the
plaintiff, who had failed to file suit in Pennsylvania federal court
before the Pennsylvania tort statute of limitations period ran, to file a
tort action in Mississippi federal court and then have the suit
transferred back to Pennsylvania along with the more generous sixyear statute of limitations period required under Mississippi’s choiceof-law rules. 221 Ferens, although not a bankruptcy case, is an example
of forum shopping at its zenith. 222 In addition, it shows that Klaxon
encourages forum shopping by requiring federal courts to apply state
choice-of-law rules. 223
While the Bankruptcy Code does have some provisions that
discourage forum shopping by limiting where a debtor may file for
bankruptcy, there is some flexibility to those limitations, especially for
business debtors. For example, under Chapter 11, an individual may
file in the district where she or he resides. 224 However, if an individual
debtor wants to take advantage of a state’s exemption scheme, which
219

Ferens, 494 U.S. at 538 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[T]he file-and-transfer
ploy sanctioned by the Court today will be available . . . to bring home to the desired
state of litigation all sorts of favorable choice-of-law rules regarding substantive
liability—in an era when the diversity among the States in choice-of-law principles
has become kaleidoscopic.” Id. Justice Scalia’s dissent was joined by Justices
Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun. Id. at 533.
220
Id. at 518–19.
221
Id. at 519–20.
222
Id. at 535–36 (“The plaintiffs were seeking to achieve exactly what Klaxon
was designed to prevent: the use of a Pennsylvania federal court instead of a
Pennsylvania state court in order to obtain application of a different substantive law.
. . . The significant federal judicial policy expressed in Erie and Klaxon is reduced to
a laughingstock if it can so readily be evaded through filing-and-transfer.”).
223
Fruehwald, supra note 3, at 43.
224
28 U.S.C. § 1408 (2006).

343
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2010

35

Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 5, Iss. 2 [2010], Art. 3

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 5, Issue 2

Spring 2010

determines the property that is exempted from the bankruptcy estate,
the debtor must have been domiciled in that state for the 730 days
preceding the filing of the bankruptcy petition. 225 If the debtor has not
lived in a single place for that period of time, then the law of the state
where the debtor lived for the 180 days before filing bankruptcy
supplies the state exemption option. 226 Business debtors, on the other
hand, have a variety of venue options. They may file in the state where
the business is incorporated, in the state where its principle place of
business is located, in the state where its assets are located, or in the
state where its affiliate, general partner, or partnership’s bankruptcy is
pending. 227 These options provide business debtors with considerable
flexibility in choosing where to file bankruptcy, and in a significant
percentage of large Chapter 11 cases, Delaware and New York are the
jurisdictions most often selected. 228 One example of forum shopping
that occurred under the flexible options offered to corporate debtors
was Winn-Dixie’s bankruptcy. 229 Winn-Dixie, a Florida-based grocery
chain, incorporated a New York subsidiary, saddled it with debt, and
then had the subsidiary file for bankruptcy twelve days later.230 This
allowed the parent company to file for bankruptcy in New York

225

11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(3)(A).
Id.
227
28 U.S.C. § 1408.
228
See Theodore Eisenberg & Lynn M. LoPucki, Shopping for Judges: An
Empirical Analysis of Venue Choice in Large Chapter 11 Reorganizations, 84
CORNELL L. REV. 967, 968 (1999); Lynn M. LoPucki, Points of View; Commentary
and Analysis, Courting the Big Bankrupts, LEGAL TIMES, July 18, 2005, at 58.
[hereinafter LoPucki, Courting the Big Bankrupts]. LoPucki’s empirical analysis and
anecdotal evidence have focused on forum shopping, the competition by courts and
judges for large Chapter 11 cases, and the negative effects on the bankruptcy system.
Eisenberg & LoPucki, supra, at 967–72. However, not all scholars agree that forum
shopping is bad, and they have criticized LoPucki’s analysis for failing to distinguish
between good and bad forum shopping. Todd J. Zywicki, Review Essay, Is Forum
Shopping Corrupting America’s Bankruptcy Courts?, 94 GEO. L.J. 1141, 1143
(2006).
229
LoPucki, Courting the Big Bankrupts, supra note 228, at 59.
230
Id.
226
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shortly thereafter because its affiliate’s bankruptcy was pending in the
state. 231
Bankruptcy courts have recognized the opportunity for forum
shopping and have applied a federal choice-of-law rule to ensure that
forum shopping is not used to manipulate the claims allowance
process. 232 In In re Segre’s Iron Works, Inc., the debtor objected to a
proof of claim filed by a creditor based on alleged fraudulent
representations made by the debtor about a sculpture attributed to
Alexander Calder. 233 The debtor argued that the creditor’s claim was
not enforceable because Connecticut’s statute of limitations for tort
actions had run. 234 The court applied a federal common law choice-oflaw rule and found that New York, where most of the relevant acts
took place, had the greatest interest in the case. 235 The court explained
that:
It is fundamentally unfair, and subversive of
uniformity, for a debtor to be permitted to defeat a
creditor’s claim—which was timely prosecuted in, and
under the law of, the state with the greatest interest in
the dispute—through the simple maneuver of filing a
bankruptcy case in a different state where a less
generous statute of limitation arguably controls.
Allowance of claims against a bankruptcy estate should
not depend upon the happenstance or devise of
bankruptcy venue. To rule otherwise would encourage
forum-shopping by debtors who may contemplate
moving a residence, or restructuring business
operations to permit a bankruptcy filing in a state with

231
232

Id.
In re Segre’s Iron Works, Inc., 258 B.R. 547, 551–52 (Bankr. D. Conn.

2001).
233

Id. at 549–50.
Id. at 550–51.
235
Id. at 551.
234
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an expired limitations period as to material claims
against them. 236
Thus, an opportunity for forum shopping exists, and debtors may
engage in forum shopping to take advantage of courts 237 or state
substantive law, such as a statute of limitations, that is considered
desirable. 238 The ability to forum shop under Chapter 11’s venue
provision has been recognized, and efforts at reform have been
supported by bankruptcy experts, members of Congress, the National
Bankruptcy Review Commission, state attorneys general, and
consumer, employee, and small business interest groups. 239 However,
Congressional efforts to amend the provision have been
unsuccessful. 240 Creating federal choice-of-law rules that do not favor
236

Id. at 552.
LoPucki, Courting the Big Bankrupts, supra note 228, at 58.
238
In re Segre’s Iron Works, Inc., 258 B.R. 547, 550–51.
239
John Cornyn, Points of View; Commentary and Analysis, They Owe Us:
Companies Seeking Bankruptcy Relief Should Face Creditors in Their Home Court,
LEGAL TIMES, June 6, 2005, at 67.
240
In response to corporate Chapter 11 forum shopping, Texas Senator John
Cornyn introduced a bill, the Fairness in Bankruptcy Litigation Act of 2005, to
amend 28 U.S.C. § 1408, the Bankruptcy Code’s venue provision for Chapter 11
cases in 2005. Cornyn, supra note 239. Senator Cornyn cited the filing of Houstonbased Enron’s bankruptcy claim in New York in 2001 as an example of corporate
bankruptcy forum shopping. Id. As Attorney General of Texas, Cornyn had argued
that Enron should have faced its creditors and filed for bankruptcy in Texas. Id. The
bill would have amended the venue provision to limit the jurisdictions available to
corporate debtors that were filing bankruptcy. Id. The proposed reforms were based
on a major recommendation of the National Bankruptcy Review Commission, and
the legislation was supported by leading bankruptcy experts, a bipartisan coalition of
twenty-four state attorneys general, as well as groups representing consumer,
employee, and small business interests. Id. Senator Cornyn attempted to attach his
bill as an amendment to BAPCPA, the bankruptcy overhaul bill that was enacted in
2005. Gebe Martinez, Bankruptcy Bill Losing Enron Link: Cornyn Taking Out
Measure on ‘Judge Shopping’, HOUSTON CHRONICLE, March 3, 2005,
http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/special/05/legislature/3065576.html.
However, faced with the strong opposition of then-Senator and now-Vice President
Joseph Biden, and his fellow Delaware Senator Thomas Carper, who were concerned
about potential revenue losses to their state, Senator Cornyn was forced to drop the
237
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a particular forum could prevent forum shopping and would likely be
less controversial than trying to amend the Chapter 11 venue
provisions, under which some states have benefitted. 241
B. Relevant Constitutional Provisions
Five constitutional provisions have been identified that have
varying levels of relevance in conflict of laws and provide
constitutional limits on state authority or require cooperation by the
states. 242 Those provisions include: the Full Faith and Credit Clause;
the Due Process Clause; the Equal Protection Clause; the Commerce
Clause; and the Privileges and Immunities Clause. 243 In choice-of-law
cases, the Supreme Court has discussed both the Due Process and Full
Faith and Credit Clauses. 244 In the context of bankruptcy and choiceof-law, three clauses—the Bankruptcy Clause, the Necessary and
Proper Clause, and the Full Faith and Credit Clause—are all relevant
to the discussion of Congress’ power to enact choice-of-law rules.245

amendment. Id. The Fairness in Bankruptcy Litigation Act of 2005 was never voted
out of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary. S. 314, 109th Cong. (1st Sess. 2005).
241
See supra note 240.
242
LEA BRILMAYER, CONFLICT OF LAWS: FOUNDATIONS AND FUTURE
DIRECTIONS § 3.1, at 112, 128 (1991).
243
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; U.S. CONST. art.
I, § 8, cl. 3; U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1; BRILMAYER, supra note 240, § 3.1, at
112.
244
See Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930) (due process); Bradford
Elec. Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145 (1932) (full faith and credit); Hartford
Accident & Indem. Co. v. Delta & Pine Land Co., 292 U.S. 143 (1934) (due
process); Alaska Packers Assoc. v. Indus. Accident Comm’n, 294 U.S. 532 (1935)
(full faith and credit); Pac. Employers Ins. Co. v. Indus. Accident Comm’n, 306 U.S.
493 (1939) (full faith and credit); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1981)
(due process and full faith and credit); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S.
797 (1985) (due process and full faith and credit); Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S.
717 (1988) (due process and full faith and credit); Franchise Tax Bd. v. Hyatt, 538
U.S. 488 (2003) (full faith and credit).
245
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18; U.S. CONST.
art. III, § 1.
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The Bankruptcy Clause empowers Congress to enact bankruptcy
laws, 246 and the Necessary and Proper Clause grants Congress the
power to enact laws to execute its enumerated powers, 247 which
include the Bankruptcy Clause. Furthermore, Congress has the ability
to establish lower federal courts under Articles I and III of the
Constitution. 248 It follows that Congress has the power to create
bankruptcy courts, the bankruptcy laws, and the rules of procedures
used by the courts. 249 Thus, Congress has the power to enact federal
choice-of-law rules as part of its ability to establish the bankruptcy
court’s rules pursuant to its power under the Bankruptcy Clause and
Necessary and Proper Clause. 250
Another legislative avenue for Congress, and the more direct
grant of power vis-à-vis choice-of-law, is the Full Faith and Credit
Clause. 251 Congress has the power to legislate choice-of-law rules
under the Full Faith and Credit Clause, which provides that “Full Faith
and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and
judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by
general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and
Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof.” 252 How to apply
the Full Faith and Credit Clause to each state’s public acts is the
portion of the clause relevant to choice-of-law issues.
The debate on the Full Faith and Credit Clause at the
Constitutional Convention of 1787 was limited, but the comments of
those moving for action on the clause provide some insight into its
purpose. 253 On the day that the most extensive debate on the Full Faith
and Credit Clause took place, the Bankruptcy Clause was also
discussed, and bankruptcy was discussed as part of the need for the
246

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
248
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 9; U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
249
See Cross, supra note 8, at 561; Gardina, supra note 12, at 925.
250
Id.
251
See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
252
See id.
253
Jackson, supra note 1, at 4.
247
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Full Faith and Credit Clause. 254 The records from August 29, 1787,
note that, “Mr. Wilson & Docr. Johnson supposed the meaning to be
that Judgments in one State should be ground of actions in other
States, & that acts of the Legislatures should be included, for the sake
of Acts of insolvency &c.” 255 It is interesting that members of the
Constitutional Convention believed that there was a connection
between bankruptcy and the Full Faith and Credit Clause. 256 Although
the clause was discussed later in the Constitutional Convention, the
final form of the Full Faith and Credit Clause is substantially similar to
the version of the clause that resulted from the debates on that day. 257
Most importantly, the second sentence of the Full Faith and Credit
Clause grants Congress the power to enact laws that determine how
full faith and credit shall be given to each state’s public acts, records
and judicial proceedings. 258 However, the early Congresses used their
power under the Full Faith and Credit Clause very sparingly, 259 and
the more modern Congresses have also been reluctant to use their
power. 260 As a result, the courts have been left to determine how to
apply the Full Faith and Credit Clause.261
254

2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 447 (Max Farrand
ed. 1911). The next comment that was recorded, in the middle of the discussion
surrounding the Full Faith and Credit Clause, was a motion to commit to the
Bankruptcy Clause. Id. The comments then returned to the Full Faith and Credit
Clause. Id. at 447–48. As originally proposed, the Full Faith and Credit Clause
provided no power to Congress. Jackson, supra note 1, at 4–5. The debate reflects
that James Madison wanted Congress to have the power “to provide for the
execution of Judgments in other States”; however this drew opposition from Mr.
Randolph. RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra, at 448. Gouverneur
Morris then moved to commit to the Full Faith and Credit Clause, and his motion
was adopted: “[T]he Legislature shall by general laws, determine the proof and
effect of such acts, records and proceedings.” Id.
255
Id. at 447.
256
See id.
257
Jackson, supra note 1, at 5.
258
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
259
Jackson, supra note 1, at 5–6.
260
See SYMEONIDES, THE AMERICAN CHOICE-OF-LAW REVOLUTION, supra
note 22 ¶ 4 n. 11(citing two statutes that Congress has passed, 28 U.S.C. § 1738A,
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C. Institutional Considerations
Institutional considerations are significant in determining whether
the Supreme Court or Congress should create choice-of-law rules. The
Supreme Court has almost completely withdrawn from the discussion
over choice-of-law and the Full Faith and Credit Clause, 262 and its
recent dicta has provided little guidance to the bar or the lower courts.
In Franchise Tax Board of California v. Hyatt, the Court stated that:
[O]ur precedent differentiates the credit owed to laws
(legislative measures and common law) and to
judgments . . . Whereas the full faith and credit
command is exacting with respect to [a] final judgment
. . . rendered by a court with adjudicatory authority over
the subject matter and persons governed by the
judgment, . . . it is less demanding with respect to
choice of laws. 263
In its earlier Full Faith and Credit jurisprudence, the Court had
attempted to apply a balancing approach to resolving conflicts
between state laws. 264 However, the Court found the balancing
approach unsatisfactory and subsequently abandoned that approach for
resolving conflicts of law. 265

the Federal Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act, and 28 U.S.C. § 1738C, the
“Defense of Marriage Act.”)
261
Jackson, supra note 1, at 6.
262
Douglas A. Laycock, Equal Citizens of Equal and Territorial States: The
Constitutional Foundations of Choice of Law, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 249, 257 (1992).
263
538 U.S. 488, 494 (2003) (citing Baker v. Gen. Motors Corp., 522 U.S.
222, 232–33 (1998)) (internal quotations omitted).
264
Id. at 495 (citing Bradford Elec. Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145
(1932)).
265
Id. at 495–96.
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As a result, the Court’s Full Faith and Credit analysis has been
collapsed into Due Process analysis in the choice-of-law context. 266
Justice Stevens believes that the analysis of the two clauses are
separate inquiries because the “provisions protect different
interests.” 267 The Due Process Clause, which provides that no “State
shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law,” protects individual rights, while the Full Faith and
Credit Clause, which provides that “Full Faith and Credit shall be
given in each State to the public Acts, Records and judicial
Proceedings of every other State,” is designed to protect the interstate
system. 268 Justice O’Connor, writing for the Court in Hyatt,
acknowledged that the Court had been previously unsuccessful in
finding an approach to resolve state law conflicts under the Full Faith
and Credit Clause, but refused to do so stating, “[w]ithout a rudder to
steer us, we decline to embark on the constitutional course of
balancing coordinate States’ competing sovereign interests to resolve
conflicts of laws under the Full Faith and Credit Clause.”269
By failing to create clear choice-of-law rules or a separate
approach from the one applied to due process inquiries to deal with
conflicts between state laws when the Full Faith and Credit Clause is
invoked, the Court has gone down the problematic paths that Justice
Robert H. Jackson identified in his 1945 article, Full Faith and

266

Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 308 n.10 (1981) (“This Court has
taken a similar approach in deciding choice-of-law cases under both the Due Process
Clause and the Full Faith and Credit Clause. In each instance, the Court has
examined the relevant contacts and resulting interests of the State whose law was
applied . . . Although at one time the Court required a more exacting standard under
the Full Faith and Credit Clause than under the Due Process Clause for evaluating
the constitutionality of choice-of-law decisions, . . . the Court has since abandoned
the weighing-of-interests requirement.”); Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717,
735 n.2 (1988) (Brennan, J., concurring) (“The minimum requirements imposed by
the Due Process Clause are, in this context, the same as those imposed by the Full
Faith and Credit Clause.”)
267
Allstate Insurance Co., 449 U.S. at 321–22 (Stevens, J. concurring).
268
See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
269
Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Hyatt, 538 U.S. 488, 495–99 (2003).
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Credit—The Lawyer’s Clause of the Constitution. 270 Although Justice
Jackson did not find comfort in the prospect of the Court creating a
uniform approach to choice-of-law problems, he did identify the
confusion and difficulties that would arise if the Court did not adopt an
approach to Full Faith and Credit in relation to public acts:
[T]he available courses from which our choice may
be made seem to be limited. One is that we will leave
choice of law in all cases to the local policy of the state.
This seems to me to be at odds with the implication of
our federal system that the mutual limits of the states’
powers are defined by the Constitution. It also seems
productive of confusion, for it means that choice among
conflicting substantive rules depends only upon which
state happens to have the last word. And that we are not
likely to accept such a principle is certainly indicated
by the Court’s sporadic interferences with choice of
law, whether under the rubric of due process, full faith
and credit, or otherwise. A second course is that we will
adopt no rule, permit a good deal of overlapping and
confusion, but interfere now and then, without
imparting to the bar any reason by which the one or the
other course is to be guided or predicted. This seems to
me about where our present decisions leave us. Third,
we may candidly recognize that choice-of-law
questions, when properly raised, ought to and do
present constitutional questions under the full faith and
credit clause which the Court may properly decide and
as to which it ought at least to mark out reasonably
narrow limits of permissible variation in areas where
there is confusion. 271

270
271

Jackson, supra note 1, at 26–27.
Id.
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The first and second options identified by Jackson, that choice-of-law
policy is left to the states and the Court inserts itself intermittently
without adopting a choice-of-law approach, 272 accurately describe the
current state of the Court’s Full Faith and Credit jurisprudence on
public acts. The Court acknowledged as much in Hyatt:
As Justice Robert H. Jackson . . . aptly observed,
‘it [is] difficult to point to any field in which the Court
has more completely demonstrated or more candidly
confessed the lack of guiding standards of a legal
character than in trying to determine what choice of law
is required by the Constitution.’ 273
However, the Court’s opinion in Hyatt indicates that the Court is not
inclined to try to create guiding standards or a balancing approach for
resolving state law conflicts and would only be disposed do so if the
right case landed on its docket. 274
Additionally, the Court has declared that judicial creation of
federal common law is only warranted in a few, select
circumstances. 275 In creating federal common law, the Court has stated
that “‘the guiding principle is that a significant conflict between some
federal policy or interest and the use of state law . . . must first be
specifically shown.’” 276 Arguably, the interest in national uniformity
in the administration of bankruptcy cases is a federal policy or interest
that is violated by the application of non-uniform state choice-of-law
rules; however, the courts have disagreed on that point. 277
272

See id.
Hyatt, 538 U.S. at 496 (quoting Jackson, supra note 1, at 16.).
274
See id. at 498–99.
275
Atherton v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 519 U.S. 213, 218 (1997) (citing
O’Melveny & Myers v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 512 U.S.79, 87 (1994)).
276
Id. at 218 (quoting Wallis v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63, 68
(1966)).
277
Compare In re Lindsay, 59 F.3d 942, 948 (9th Cir. 1995) (“The value of
national uniformity of approach need not be subordinated, therefore, to differences in
state choice of law rules.”) with In re Gaston & Snow, 243 F.3d 599, 606 (2d Cir.
273
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Although Congress has also been reluctant to use its power under
the Full Faith and Credit Clause, it is better suited to address the
choice-of-law issue. Moreover, bankruptcy presents Congress an
opportunity to legislate choice-of-law rules in a discrete area of law.
From an institutional perspective, Congress is used to balancing
interests. Every time Congress drafts a new piece of legislation, it
balances the interests of different constituencies and makes difficult
choices. In crafting legislation, Congress has the advantage of being
able to approach issues in a holistic manner, instead of dealing with
issues on a case-by-case basis, as the courts must do. Instead of
considering one fact pattern, Congress can look at the big picture in
drafting choice-of-law rules. Furthermore, the legislative process
affords Congress several advantages—the ability to hold hearings,
consider the testimony of a wide variety of scholars and experts, and
gather as much information as is necessary to analyze the possible
approaches to choice-of-law in the bankruptcy context. In addition, the
federal legislative process affords all fifty states the ability to engage
in the debate over choice-of-law rules through their senators and
representatives. Finally, Congress has exhibited its ability to deal with
these issues in the bankruptcy context by creating a choice-of-law rule
to determine which state’s exemptions a debtor is entitled to claim. 278
CONCLUSION
American conflict of laws professors have been engaged in a
discussion over drafting a Third Restatement of Conflict of Laws for
over ten years, yet the debate continues. 279 The states are following a
wide variety of state choice-of-law methodologies that produce
different outcomes in similar cases depending on which state’s choiceof-law rules are applied. These inconsistent outcomes are at odds with

2001) (“We find no such federal policy or interest that would be violated, in this
case, if the choice of law rules of the forum state were utilized.”).
278
11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(3)(A) (2006).
279
SYMEONIDES, THE AMERICAN CHOICE-OF-LAW REVOLUTION, supra note
22, ¶ 374.
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the uniform nature of the federal bankruptcy system and impact both
debtors and creditors.
The Supreme Court has not provided guidance to the federal
courts on whether state or federal choice-of-law rules should be
applied in federal question cases, and as a result, the circuits are split.
Because the Supreme Court is reluctant to create federal common law
and Congress, as an institution, is better suited to enact choice-of-laws
and has the constitutional authority to do so, Congress should enact
federal choice-of-law rules for bankruptcy cases. A set of federal
choice-of-law rules for bankruptcy cases would resolve an issue with
which the federal courts have been grappling for over sixty years and
ensure uniform treatment of debtors and creditors confronting choiceof-law issues in the bankruptcy context.
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